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I. INTRODUCTION
Following Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 1 which eliminated a private cause of action for
aider and abettor liability in securities law regulation but did not
wholly proscribe liability for secondary actors, 2 the secondary ac-
tor landscape of securities law went through a period in which
plaintiffs' attorneys attempted to assert claims on innovative
theories of indirect liability in order to establish primary liability. 3
In response to these theories, three circuit courts of appeals, in
addition to numerous district courts, have issued opinions setting
forth various tests for determining how and when to impose pri-
mary liability and, specifically, scheme liability.4 Recently, the
1. 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (superceded by statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 § 20, as recognized by SEC v. Pasternak, 561 F. Supp. 2d 459, 501 (D.N.J. 2008)).
2. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177. A secondary actor is a party that assists a business
entity in violating the securities laws even though the assisting party does nothing to in-
duce the public dissemination of information pertaining to the violation and does not re-
lease such information itself.
3. Nicholas Fortune Schanbaum, Scheme Liability: Rule lOb-5(a) and Secondary
Actor Liability After Central Bank, 26 REV. OF LITIG. 183, 184 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000) (superceded by
statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 20, as recognized by In re Nash
Finch Co. Sec. Litig., 323 F. Supp. 2d 956 (D. Minn. 2004); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP,
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Supreme Court of the United States laid to rest many of these new
theories in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc.
5
In Stoneridge, the Supreme Court held that primary liability
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("SEA")
does not extend to the conduct of third parties that participate in
deceptive business transactions, despite the fact these transac-
tions are intended to-and succeed in-deceiving investors.
6
Thus, Stoneridge held that plaintiffs cannot assert a successful
cause of action by relying on scheme liability to satisfy the neces-
sary causation and reliance elements. 7 While the Stoneridge
Court held that a claim under Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule
10b-5 against parties transacting "business" with an issuer of se-
curities does not result in scheme liability, the Court's reasoning
was based on faulty logic and prevents the securities laws from
serving their purpose. In short, the Supreme Court created a
blanket exemption, independent of the facts of a particular case,
for secondary actors in their dealings with issuers of securities.
The Court held that a party must make a public misstatement
before the schemer can be held liable under the securities laws.8
The majority's reasoning is susceptible to being easily abused with
minimal effort on the part of would-be defendants and is, there-
fore, an inappropriate test to determine liability when considering
complex sham business transactions. Rather, the proper method
of analysis for extending liability to secondary actors is the "sub-
stantial participation test" developed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 9 This test examines the facts in each case before the
court and places secondary liability on those actors where it is
deemed appropriate. Due to the wide variety of factual scenarios
and the varying degree in which would-be defendants enter into
fraudulent business transactions, a case-by-case analysis is best
suited to meet the goals of the securities laws and protect the in-
vesting public.
152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.
1996).
5. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
6. Travis S. Souza, Freedom to Defraud: Stoneridge, Primary Liability, and the Need
to Properly Define Section 10(b), 57 DUKE L.J. 1179 (2008).
7. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774.
8. Id. at 769.
9. See Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 n.5. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated that "sub-
stantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements
is grounds for primary liability even though that participation might not lead to the actor's
actual making of the statements." Id.
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Section II of this comment will introduce and discuss aspects of
the securities laws relevant to securities transactions in general,
but specifically to the Supreme Court's decision in Stoneridge.
After exploring the laws which provide the foundation for this
area of the law, Section III will examine the Court's decision in
Stoneridge. It will also offer a brief critique of the Stoneridge
opinion. After considering the current legal analytical approach
for reviewing secondary actor liability, the Ninth Circuit's test,
which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Stoneridge, will be
compared to the new law advanced in Stoneridge, and the argu-
ment will be made that the Supreme Court's decision provides
secondary actors with a shield from liability that is too broad and
does not look at the facts of the particular case to determine
whether the secondary actor's conduct warrants liability. Finally,
Part III will argue that the Supreme Court should retreat from
Stoneridge and adopt the Ninth Circuit's substantial participation
test when faced with imposing secondary actor liability in the
form of scheme liability in securities law litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
The federal laws regarding fraudulent securities transactions
are found in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.10 Congress's intent in enacting the Securities
Act of 1933 was "to provide investors with full disclosure of mate-
rial information concerning public offerings of securities in com-
merce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposi-
tion of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of
honesty and fair dealing."11  Meanwhile, the SEA was drafted
"principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock
prices through regulation of transactions upon securities ex-
changes and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular
reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on na-
tional securities exchanges." 12 Congress, recognizing the need for
flexibility in the regulation of securities, created the Securities
Exchange Commission ("the SEC") in the 1934 Act to interpret
and enforce the securities laws.'
3
10. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006) & 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006).
11. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d.
Cong. 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933)).





Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act grants the SEC authority to pro-
hibit deceptive and manipulative conduct related to the purchase
or sale of securities. 14 Section 10(b) of the SEA specifically prohib-
its "the use or employ[ment of] . .. any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."'15 Un-
der its administrative rulemaking authority, the SEC promul-
gated Rule 10b-5.16 Rule 10b-5 provides guidance in interpreting
the broad framework of conduct barred in Section 10(b). The Rule
proscribes three types of actions: (a) "any device, scheme, or arti-
fice to defraud"; (b) making "any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading"; and (c) "to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person."'17 Of course, any of
these actions must be made in connection with the sale or pur-
chase of securities.' 8 While the SEC provided these three broad
examples of conduct that violate Section 10(b), it did not provide
information regarding "the elements of a Rule 10b-5 violation or
the level of conduct that would constitute a violation."'19 Federal
courts, therefore, had to apply the rule in its skeletal form and
flesh out "the ultimate extent of section 10(b) by examining the
statute in the context of the Securities Acts as a whole."20 The
courts compared Section 10(b) and the Securities Acts of 1933 and
1934 and determined that there was a reliance requirement im-
plied by the statutes. 2' The Supreme Court has also found an im-
plied requirement that, in order to bring a claim under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of
securities.
22
While Congress did not provide for a private cause of action un-
der Section 10(b), courts have implied one.23 The courts have also
14. Id. (stating that the SEC is "provided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement pow-
ers"). Id.
15. Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)-(c).
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
19. Schanbaum, supra note 3, at 187.
20. Id. at 187-88.
21. Id. at 188.
22. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735-36 (1975).
23. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 748-49.
Vol. 47
Abrogating Scheme Liability
added requirements to a Section 10(b) cause of action that must be
satisfied before scheme liability can be imposed because scheme
liability is a type of primary liability under Section 10(b). 24 Plain-
tiffs asserting a private cause of action must demonstrate that the
defendant used or employed a "deceptive device or contrivance."
25
Significantly, there is a threshold element of materiality that re-
quires a substantial likelihood that revealing omitted facts would
be deemed by a reasonable investor to significantly change the
pool of information available. 26 Also, plaintiffs are required to al-
lege fraud "in connection with a purchase or sale of any secu-
rity."27 In other words, because a transaction in which securities
are exchanged must occur, the plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 cause of
action must be either a purchaser or seller of a security.
28
In addition, plaintiffs are required to prove reliance on the fraud
or deception, which provides "the requisite causal connection be-
tween a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."
29
Thus, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct caused
the purchase or sale of securities. 30 While showing reliance may
prove challenging for a plaintiff, if the security at issue is traded
on an open and developed stock market, a plaintiff does not need
to demonstrate specific reliance. 31  Rather, the "fraud-on-the-
market" theory provides "that, in an open and developed securities
market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the avail-
able material information regarding the company and its busi-
ness."
32
24. Eric Berry, Stoneridge and the Short-Lived Experiment of Scheme Liability, 4
N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 355, 357 (2007).
25. Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
26. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
27. Securities Exchange Act, Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
28. Id.
29. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 243.
30. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 174 (3d Cir.
2001).
31. Berry, supra note 24, at 358-59.
32. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241 (1988) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d
Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, "[m]isleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements .... The causal
connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a
case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations." Peil, 806
F.2d at 1160-61. The fraud-on-the-market theory is defined as "the doctrine, that, in a
claim under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, a plaintiff may pre-
sumptively establish reliance on a misstatement about a security's value-without proving
actual knowledge of the fraudulent statement-if the stock is purchased in an open and
developed securities market." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (8th ed. 2004).
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A plaintiff is required to demonstrate that his or her loss was
caused by the fraud or deception of the defendant. 33 Thus, a plain-
tiff cannot rely on "changed economic circumstances, changed in-
vestor expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts,
conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together
account for some or all of that lower price." 34 Finally, scienter 35
must be pled with particularity. 36 The state of mind required for a
private cause of action is "intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud."37 Thus, the scienter standard bars securities cases that
allege mere negligence and not some more culpable form of in-
tent.38
A. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Den-
ver, N.A.
In 1994, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case
with significant consequences regarding primary liability for sec-
ondary actors: Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A. 39 Central Bank of Denver served as the in-
denture trustee40 for bonds issued in 1986 and 1988 to finance con-
struction on a residential and commercial development in Colo-
rado Springs, Colorado.41 The bonds, secured by landowner as-
sessment liens, had covenants which "required that the land sub-
ject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding
principal and interest."42 The covenants also required the prop-
erty developer to provide Central Bank with a yearly report dem-
onstrating the 160% test was satisfied.43 Before the 1988 bonds
33. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
34. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343.
35. Scienter is defined as "a mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1115 (8th ed. 2004).
36. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2000). The PSLRA requires that "the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an
allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the com-
plaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." Id. at § 78u-
4(b)(1)(B).
37. Ernst and Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185.
38. Id.
39. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
40. Indenture trustee is defined as "a trustee named in a trust indenture and charged
with holding legal title to the trust property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed.
2004). An indenture is "a formal written instrument made by two or more parties with
different interests." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (8th ed. 2004).





were issued, the property developer supplied an updated assess-
ment of the land securing the bonds issued in 1986 and of the land
expected to secure the bonds issued in 1988.44 This assessment
contained land values that were virtually unchanged from the
prior assessment.45 After receiving the updated assessment, Cen-
tral Bank was notified by an underwriter for the 1986 bonds "that
property values were declining in Colorado Springs and that Cen-
tral Bank was operating on an appraisal over 16 months old[.]
[T]he underwriter expressed concern that the 160% test was not
being met."46 At this point, Central Bank's in-house appraiser
recommended obtaining an independent review by an outside ap-
praiser to assess the property values.47
However, before the outside appraisal could be conducted, the
bond issuer defaulted and First Interstate Bank of Denver, having
purchased $2.1 million worth of the 1988 bonds, filed suit against
Central Bank alleging violations of § 10(b) and that Central Bank
was "secondarily liable under § 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and
abetting the fraud."48 The Supreme Court held that "[b]ecause the
text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, . . . a private
plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under §
10(b)." 49 The Court reasoned that, while the statute prohibited
making a material misstatement, "[tihe proscription does not in-
clude giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or decep-
tive act."50 The Court stated it could not "amend the statute to
create liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or
deceptive within the meaning of the statute."51 The Court further
reasoned that the "absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability
does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are
always free from liability under the securities Acts."52 While the
Court noted that multiple parties may be involved in any intricate
securities fraud, First Interstate Bank admitted that "Central
Bank did not commit a manipulative or deceptive act with the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 167.
47. Id. at 167-68.
48. Id. at 168.
49. Id. at 191.
50. Id. at 177.
51. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177-78.
52. Id. at 191.
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meaning of § 10(b)." 53 Thus, by the plaintiffs own words, Central
Bank was not liable as an aider and abettor.
54
Thus, Central Bank represented a significant departure from
precedent leading up to the case. Central Bank altered the securi-
ties litigation rules regarding "secondary actors by flatly stating
that the absence of the words 'aiding and abetting,' in either sec-
tion 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, precludes a section 10(b) aiding and abet-
ting cause of action."55 Before Central Bank, plaintiffs were free to
allege violations of the securities laws against parties aiding and
abetting securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. 56 Also, some lower
federal courts found "an implied private right of action against
aiders and abettors."57 In the wake of Central Bank, subsections
(a) and (c) fell by the wayside.
58
Despite the Supreme Court's abrogation of a private cause of ac-
tion for aider and abettor liability in Central Bank, the decision in
Central Bank left open the possibility that some form of secondary
actor liability may still exist.59 In Central Bank, the Supreme
Court, in eliminating the possibility of aider and abettor liability,
stated that "the statute prohibits only the making of a material
misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative
act."60  The Central Bank Court stated that its holding barring
aider and abettor liability "does not include giving aid to a person
who commits a manipulative or deceptive act."6' 1 In addition, de-
spite the Supreme Court's clear pronouncement that aider and
abettor liability does not exist, the Court did not delineate what
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Schanbaum, supra note 3, at 189.
56. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 193 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Souza, supra note 6, at 1181-82. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins.
Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969) (abro-
gated by Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994)).
58. Schanbaum, supra note 3, at 189.
59. In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary ac-
tors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts.
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a ma-
nipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a pur-
chaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5,
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (emphasis in original). The Court went on to indicate that
secondary actors primarily liable for a section 10(b) violation would be exposed to primary
liability in a section 10(b) action. Id.
60. Id. at 177.
61. Id. at 177-78.
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actions would constitute a "material misstatement" and make a
party a primary violator.62 Thus, the task of interpreting the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court's abrogation of aider and abettor li-
ability fell to the lower federal courts. This process of interpreta-
tion ultimately focused on determining what actions rose to such a
level sufficient to impose primary liability.63 As a result, compet-
ing tests for imposing primary liability developed among the
United States Courts of Appeals.
B. Three Competing Tests for Secondary Actor Liability and the
Abrogation of Scheme Liability
In light of Central Bank's partial proscription of secondary actor
liability,64 courts faced a difficult challenge in determining the dif-
ference between primary and secondary violators. As a result,
several competing tests were advanced by plaintiffs in various
lower federal courts. Thus, by the time the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear Stoneridge, several different tests for
determining scheme liability had emerged among the circuit
courts of appeals. Among these tests were the "bright line test"
employed by the Second Circuit, the "substantial participation
test" employed by the Ninth Circuit, and the "co-author test"
which was advanced by the SEC.
65
The bright line test requires "public attribution of the secondary
actor's fraudulent statement."66 Thus, the test requires-as did
the Supreme Court in Central Bank-that a plaintiff rely on the
defendant's misstatement. The substantial participation test, ap-
plied by the Ninth Circuit, focuses on a secondary actor's fraudu-
lent conduct to determine if liability exists. Thus, under the sub-
stantial participation analysis, there is less of a focus on the plain-
62. Id. at 164.
63. Schanbaum, supra note 3, at 236-37.
64. Secondary actor liability is liability imposed on a party that assisted a public busi-
ness entity in violating the securities laws even though the assisting party does nothing to
induce the public dissemination of information pertaining to the violation and does not
release such information itself.
65. See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibited by Section 10(b)
and the Elements of Rule 1Ob-5: Reflections on Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH. U. L.
REV. 667, 675-88 (2004).
66. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997). In Shapiro, the Second Circuit
stated that:
If Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false
or misleading statement in order to be held liable under Section 10(b). Anything
short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how substantial
that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).
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tiffs reliance on the defendant's conduct.67 Finally, the co-author
test provides courts with a "compromise between the bright-line
and substantial participation tests." 68 The co-author test is more
similar to the substantial participation test than the bright line
standard in its application. 69
C. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc.
Stoneridge Investors filed suit "on behalf of purchasers of Char-
ter stock alleging that, by participating in the transactions, Scien-
tific-Atlanta and Motorola violated § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5. '' 70 Charter, a cable com-
pany, conducted a number of fraudulent business practices so that
its quarterly financial reports would satisfy expectations of inves-
tors with regard to cable subscriber growth and operating cash
flow. 71 The fraudulent business practices included: "misclassifica-
tion of its customer base; delayed reporting of terminated custom-
ers; improper capitalization of costs that should have been shown
as expenses; and manipulation of the company's billing cutoff
dates to inflate reported revenues."72 Scientific-Atlanta and Mo-
torola supplied digital cable converter ("set top") boxes to Charter,
which were in turn provided to cable subscribers. 73 The fraud oc-
curred when Charter arranged to pay Scientific-Atlanta and Mo-
torola an additional twenty dollars above the usual price for every
converter box purchased.7 4 In addition, Scientific-Atlanta and Mo-
torola agreed to "return the overpayment[s] by purchasing adver-
tising from Charter. '7 5
Stoneridge Investors alleged these transactions had no "eco-
nomic substance."76 Despite this lack of true economic value, the
transactions benefitted Charter because the advertising purchases
were recorded as revenues and capitalized in violation of generally
67. Schanbaum, supra note 3, at 197.
68. Id.
69. Id.









accepted accounting principles. 7v The transactions would also al-
low Charter to "fool its auditor into approving a financial state-
ment showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow
numbers. '78 In order to prevent its auditor from discovering this
scheme, Charter drafted documents to obscure that fact that the
transactions were related.79 Charter requested Scientific-Atlanta
to provide documents stating that production costs for the con-
verter boxes had increased, which was a lie.8 0 Scientific-Atlanta
complied with Charter's request by raising the price of the con-
verter boxes by twenty dollars per unit for the remainder of the
year.81 As for Motorola, Charter agreed to purchase "a specific
number of set top boxes and pay liquidated damages of $20 for
each unit it did not take."8 2 Charter and Motorola entered into
this contract "with the expectation Charter would fail to purchase
all the units and pay Motorola the liquidated damages.8 3 Finally,
in order to "return the additional money from the [converter] box
sales, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola signed contracts with Char-
ter to purchase advertising time for a price higher than fair [mar-
ket] value."8 4 The contracts relating to the converter boxes were
backdated "to make it appear that they were negotiated a month
before the advertising agreements."8 5
The public disclosure of the manipulated financial statements
occurred when the documents were filed with the SEC.8 6 Despite
the public dissemination of the financial statements, Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola played no part in the preparation or dis-
bursement of them.8 7 Their own financial statements recorded the
transactions as a wash in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting standards.88 Stoneridge Investors alleged that Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola "knew or were in reckless disregard of Char-
ter's intention to use the transactions to inflate revenues and
77. Id. Generally accepted accounting principles are defined as "the conventions, rules
and procedures that define approved accounting practices at a particular time." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 567 (8th ed. 2004).
78. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.









88. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 767. A wash is defined as "a situation in which two effects
offset each other." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1322 (8th ed. 2004).
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knew the resulting financial statements issued by Charter would
be relied upon by research analysts and investors.
'8 9
The District Court granted Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola's
motion for failure to state a claimed on which relief can be
granted.90 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
stating that, while respondents had aided and abetted Charter in
its scheme to misstate financial statements, no private cause of
action existed for aiding and abetting a § 10(b) violation. 91 Due to
a conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
92
The plaintiffs in Stoneridge, arguing that the Court should not
apply the bright line test, claimed that the Court should not re-
strict Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) in the same manner that Cen-
tral Bank restricted Rule lOb-5(b).93 The Supreme Court did not
agree with the plaintiff's contention because "reliance . . . is an
essential element of the section 10(b) private cause of action."
94
The reliance requirement "ensures that, for liability to arise, the
requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresenta-
tion and a plaintiffs injury exists as a predicate for liability."95
Because the public did not have the necessary knowledge, Ston-
eridge Investors "cannot show reliance upon any of respondents'
actions except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for li-
ability."
96
Despite the Court's refusal to extend liability on an aiding and
abetting theory, the plaintiffs argued that liability should be im-
posed on a scheme liability theory.97 Stoneridge Investors argued
that reliance can be shown because "the financial statement Char-
ter released to the public was a natural and expected consequence
of respondents' deceptive acts; had respondents not assisted Char-
ter, Charter's auditor would not have been fooled, and the finan-
cial statement would have been a more accurate reflection of
Charter's financial condition."98 In response to this argument, the
Court reiterated that reliance is closely related to causation and
that Section 10(b) requires that "the deceptive act must be in con-




93. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 989-90 (8th Cir. 2006), sub nom. Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
94. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
95. Id.
96. Id.




nection with the purchase or sale of any security."99 The Court
concluded that respondents' conduct, deceptive though it may
have been, was "too remote to satisfy the requirement of reli-
ance."10 0 Thus, the Court was satisfied that Charter, not Scien-
tific-Atlanta or Motorola, was the party that misled its auditor,
filed the fraudulent financial statements, and misled the public.' 0 '
In light of this reasoning, it is obvious that the Court essentially
adopted the Second Circuit's bright line test which places the
greatest emphasis on reliance. The Court further indicated that
there are only two exceptions to the reliance requirement.10 2
First, "if there is an omission of a material fact by one with a duty
to disclose, the investor to whom the duty was owed need not pro-
vide specific proof of reliance.10 3 Second, and more importantly,
the Court recognized that the fraud-on-the-market theory can sup-
plant the need for a plaintiff to demonstrate reliance. 0 4 The
Court also held that the fraud-on-the-market theory did not apply
because "no investor had knowledge of the deceptive acts at the
relevant time."'0 5  The Supreme Court immediately noted that
neither of these exceptions applied in Stoneridge.106
Interestingly, the plaintiffs argued that the reach of the fraud-
on-the-market theory should be extended because in "efficient
markets investors rely not only on the public statements relating
to a security but also upon the transactions those statements re-
flect."'0 7 Given the Court's view of reliance, plaintiffs' argument
was rejected because the Court feared that the broader standard
of reliance advocated by the plaintiffs would have the capability of
reaching the entire marketplace in which the issuing company's
securities are exchanged.
0 8
Justice Stevens's dissent argued that Section 10(b) applies to
the defendants' conduct because it was deceptive under the mean-
ing of the statute. 0 9 Despite the majority's willingness to con-




103. Id. at 769 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
153-54 (1972)).
104. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
105. Id. The Court's application of the fraud-on-the-market theory does not appear to be
a true application of the test. For more on this contention, see Section III.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 164.
108. Id.
109. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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strue Stoneridge as presenting an identical situation as Central
Bank, Justice Stevens went on to note a key factual distinction
between the two cases.110 Namely, in Central Bank, the defen-
dant-bank did not engage in any deceptive conduct; however, the
defendants in Stoneridge did engage in complex sham business
transactions that were deceptive."' The dissent also indicated
that the majority opinion improperly required the plaintiffs to al-
lege that the defendants "made it necessary or inevitable" for the
issuer to record the fraudulent business transactions the way it
did. 1 2 In other words, the majority opinion required the plaintiffs
to prove that the parties conspiring with Charter compelled Char-
ter to use the sham business transactions in a fraudulent manner.
This level of reliance is a strict requirement that necessitates a
type of evidence that will only be possessed by the occasional, for-
tuitous plaintiff.
Most importantly, Justice Stevens vigorously disagreed with the
majority's reliance standard and asserted that the majority ap-
plied the fraud-on-the-market theory incorrectly." 3 Instead of the
majority's stringent standard of reliance, the dissent stated that
the more easily satisfied standard of "transaction causation" is the
proper standard of reliance to be applied. 114 Transaction causa-
tion is "defined as requiring an allegation that but for the decep-
tive act, the plaintiff would not have entered into the securities
transaction."' 1 5 The dissent went on to note that even if the "but
for" transaction causation was not satisfied in the present case,
the plaintiff "also alleged that respondents proximately caused
Charter's misstatement of income" and that the "plaintiff ha[d]
alleged that respondents knew their deceptive acts would be the
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 776.
113. Id. The dissent asserted that:
The Court's view of the causation required to demonstrate reliance is unwarranted
and without precedent. In Basic Inc., we held that the "fraud-on-the-market" theory
provides adequate support for a presumption in private securities actions that share-
holders (or former shareholders) in publicly traded companies rely on public material
misstatements that affect the price of the company's stock. The holding in Basic is
surely a sufficient response to the argument that a complaint alleging that deceptive
acts which had a material effect on the price of a listed stock should be dismissed be-
cause the plaintiffs were not subjectively aware of the deception at the time of the se-
curities' purchase or sale. This Court has not held that investors must be aware of
the specific deceptive act which violates § 10(b) to demonstrate reliance.
Id.
114. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. See, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005).
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basis for statements that would influence the market price of
Charter stock on which shareholders would rely."116  Thus, the
defendants' "acts had the foreseeable effect of causing [investors]
to engage in the relevant securities transactions."' 117 However,
neither "but for" nor proximate causation satisfied the majority's
standard of reliance, which the dissent characterized as "unduly
stringent and unmoored from authority."118
III. ANALYSIS
While it can be argued that some federal court decisions support
the Supreme Court's rejection of scheme liability in Stoneridge,
the decision is flawed for several reasons. First, Stoneridge does
not comport with the broad remedial purposes of the securities
laws. Second, the majority's reasoning is misplaced because Ston-
eridge appears to rest on an inaccurate application of the reliance
element of a private cause of action. Specifically, the majority
opinion misconstrues the fraud-on-the-market theory by applying
it in an overly stringent manner, as noted by Justice Stevens.
Most importantly, the majority ignores the fact that scheme liabil-
ity can meet all the requirements of a private cause of action. The
Stoneridge decision, following the standard of reliance set in Cen-
tral Bank, allows for businesses to easily avoid liability despite
culpable behavior. The majority provided weak justification for
allowing this large loophole, stating that remedies for scheme li-
ability are available under state law and that abrogating scheme
liability would help to ensure the stability of the economy. For
these reasons, the holding of Stoneridge represents a break from
precedent and an overly harsh interpretation of the law. The is-
sue of scheme liability should therefore be reconsidered by the
Court. In the alternative, Congress should take steps to restore
scheme liability to help ensure an atmosphere of integrity in the
securities markets of the United States.
When compared with the overarching purpose of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it is clear
that the Stoneridge decision squarely contradicts the congres-
sional purpose of the securities legislation.1 19 The Securities Act
116. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776-77.
117. Id. at 777.
118. Id.
119. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195. See also H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933)
(stating that the SEA is "but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and
depositors."). The SEA "should be followed by legislation relating to the better supervision
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of 1933 "was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of
material information concerning public offerings of securities in
commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through the im-
position of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of
honesty and fair dealing."120 The SEA was "intended principally
to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through
regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-
the-counter markets. '121 Even though both statutes "contain nu-
merous carefully drawn express civil remedies and criminal penal-
ties, Congress recognized that efficient regulation of securities
trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory pro-
gram."122
While the majority of the Court noted the existence of other
methods of ensuring candid securities transactions and expressed
fears of scheme liability reaching the entire marketplace, the
Court nevertheless limited the broad remedial nature of the secu-
rities acts. The Court's decision foils the basic tenant of the secu-
rities laws, which is to protect the investing public from manipula-
tions and frauds whose sole purpose is to enhance stock prices of a
corporation to the detriment of investors. By holding that secon-
dary actors-who themselves do not make fraudulent state-
ments-cannot be held liable for assisting a securities issuer in
committing a fraud, the Court essentially provided an incentive
for companies to assist one another in developing complex fraudu-
lent business transactions. For example, in Stoneridge, Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola both knew or should have known that a
fraud was afoot. Both companies willingly engaged in the back-
dating of contracts, which should have raised suspicions about
Charter's motives. Instead, both companies ignored these suspi-
cions and fully participated in the fraud devised by Charter. In
addition, Scientific-Atlanta even provided documents falsely stat-
ing that is was increasing its prices in order to assist Charter in
manipulating its accounting records. Such business transactions,
of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on exchanges, and by legislation to correct
unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers and directors of banks and other cor-
porations." H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1.
120. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195. The Court continued, 'The 1934 Act was intended
principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of
transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose
regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities
exchanges." Id.




among others, should have alerted both Scientific-Atlanta and Mo-
torola that Charter was involving them in a complex fraud that
would affect Charter's financial records.
The majority's approach entails only looking to a securities is-
suer and checking to see if that party engaged in fraudulent busi-
ness practices to benefit its stock prices. As the examples above
demonstrate, fraudulent business schemes are complex, involving
multiple steps and multiple parties. By allowing aggrieved par-
ties to only seek relief from the securities issuer, the Court has
indicated that companies engaging in similar conduct-or perhaps
worse-would be insulated from liability. Without the possibility
of reprimand, there is little to prevent companies from engaging in
such conduct. Therefore, Stoneridge is inconsistent with the con-
gressional purpose of allowing the securities statues to have a
broad remedial power and fails to ensure and maintain the protec-
tion of the investing public in securities transactions.
The Court essentially turned a blind eye to the fraud committed
by the defendants solely because the fraud was behind the scenes,
relative to the securities transactions involved. The majority jus-
tified allowing such frauds, in part, by stating that punishing the
conduct of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola may lead to unbridled
liability that could reach the entire marketplace. 123 While busi-
ness dealings in the marketplace may be far-reaching, the plain-
tiffs in Stoneridge were not advocating that every fraud conducted
by businesses would result in securities liability. Instead, plain-
tiffs argued that only those business transactions entered into for
the purpose of defrauding investors (such as inflating the sales
figures, the net worth of a business, or other quantitative data
that is used to analyze the strength of a business for purposes of
investment) should be grounds to impose liability under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court's fear is demonstrated by the fact
that it adopted a standard that does not even consider the facts of
a given case. Rather, the Court blindly denied liability in all
situations.
The majority in Stoneridge further held that liability should not
extend to the defendants because there was no reliance by inves-
tors on the sham business transactions entered into by the defen-
dants. 124 The reasoning employed by the majority was that be-
cause neither a duty to disclose nor a misstatement existed, the
123. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 765, 771.
124. Id. at 769.
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plaintiff could not prove direct reliance on the fraudulent business
transactions engaged in by Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola. 125 As
discussed previously, the majority felt that the plaintiff was ask-
ing the Court to adopt a standard of reliance in which "the implied
cause of action would reach the whole marketplace in which the
issuing company does business."'126 Thus, the majority concluded
that, if a third party's actions do not make the fraudulent state-
ments "necessary or inevitable," potential plaintiffs will not be
said to have relied on those actions. 127
The dissent responded to the majority by referring to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts' definition of deceit, specifically
fraudulent misrepresentation: "[t]he maker of a fraudulent mis-
representation is subject to liability ... if the misrepresentation,
although not made directly to the other, is made to a third person
and the maker intends or has reason to expect that its terms will
be repeated or its substance communicated to the other."'128 Be-
cause the 10b-5 cause of action is based on the common law doc-
trine of deceit, the dissent concluded that "the sham transactions
described in the complaint in this case had the same effect on
Charter's profit and loss statement as a false entry directly on its
books that included $17 million of gross revenues that had not be
received."' 29  The conduct of Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola,
therefore, was clearly deceptive and should have led to liability.
Investors clearly relied upon Scientific-Atlanta's and Motorola's
conduct because those companies directly allowed Charter to ma-
nipulate accounting records-to the tune of $17 million-by pro-
viding false documentation of advertising and converter box reve-
nues, which was used to prepare faulty financial statements di-
rectly relied upon by the public.
The requirement that a 10b-5 plaintiff demonstrate reliance is
necessary to ensure that the plaintiffs harm is linked closely
enough to the defendant's conduct. 30 Thus, the reliance element
serves to eliminate those claims in which the defendant's conduct
did not cause the plaintiffs harm.' 31 The majority stated that,
because no public disclosure was made in Stoneridge, the plaintiffs
125. Id.
126. Id. at 770.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533
(1977)).
129. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 777.




did not rely on the sham business transactions taking place be-
hind the scenes. 132 However, the Court should have held that, if
undisclosed information would materially affect a reasonable in-
vestor's decision to purchase the securities, reliance should be
deemed proven, despite nondisclosure, so long as the undisclosed
information is sufficiently related to the securities exchanged.
Logically, the information relating to the sham business transac-
tions did induce reliance by investors. Once investors learned that
Charter had met Wall Street's expectations, they would rely on
the information to purchase Charter stock due to its consistent
performance. In Stoneridge, such a standard of reliance would
easily have been satisfied because Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
"[we]re alleged to have known that the outcome of their fraudulent
transactions would be communicated to investors."'
133
The majority's interpretation of the reliance standard was also
faulty because it created a standard that could rarely be met by
plaintiffs seeking redress for alleged securities violations. While it
has long been established that reliance is an element of a private
cause of action under Section 10(b),13 4 it would be only in the rar-
est of circumstances in which a plaintiff would have knowledge of
a defendant's deceptive acts at the time they transpired. Even
though the majority discussed the fraud-on-the-market theory, it
misconstrued the doctrine. The dissent, while recognizing that
the majority appropriately discussed the fraud-on-the-market the-
ory's requirements, made an interesting observation that the
fraud-on-the-market theory refers only to causation on the part of
the defrauded investors. 35 The doctrine remains silent on "what
an individual or corporation must do in order to have 'caused' the
misleading information that reached the market."' 36 Thus, the
dissent stated that the majority approached the causation issue in
an inappropriate fashion and, as a result, reached the improper
conclusion that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate reliance.
37
By stating that the fraud-on-the-market theory only applies to a
party that actually makes a public statement, the Court failed to
realize that "[p]arties should be viewed as making public state-
ments if they are intimately involved in the acts that create those
132. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
133. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Souza, supra note 6, at 1185.





statements."'138 As a result, when businesses engage in dishonest
business transactions that serve as the basis for public misstate-
ments, courts should recognize that the plaintiff has satisfied the
reliance element. 139 If such a standard had been applied in Ston-
eridge, the transactions engaged in for the purpose of inflating
stock values would surely have led to liability for Scientific-
Atlanta and Motorola for the voluntary and knowing roles they
played in assisting Charter to structure a complex series of
fraudulent business transactions.
The blanket proscription on scheme liability announced in Ston-
eridge is not desirable because the securities laws were intended
to be flexible remedial devices designed to address fraud in con-
nection with the sale or purchase of securities. More importantly,
Stoneridge follows in the footsteps of Central Bank by providing a
complete defense to culpable conduct because the standard an-
nounced in Central Bank allows for businesses to avoid liability as
long as they did not make a misstatement. Therefore, a business
is free to engage in sham transactions which influence revenues
and other statistics related to the vitality of a business so long as
that business does not make any misstatement. Basically, by re-
maining silent, the business can engage in unethical and fraudu-
lent behavior without any liability under the securities laws. The
Court dismissed this concern by simply stating that such conduct
could be addressed by litigation under state law. 140
In order to allay the Court's concerns, a case-by-case approach
to scheme liability that scrutinizes the facts and circumstances of
every case should be adopted. By taking the time to examine the
specific facts of each case, rather than simply imposing a blanket
proscription on scheme liability, scheme liability would only be
imposed in situations where the conduct of the defendants rose to
a level sufficient to recognize culpability. For example, suppose
two companies entered into a contract for the sale of goods that
dramatically affected one of the company's stock prices to the
benefit of its investors. If, at a later date, an unexpected breach
and payment of liquidated damages occurred, liability would not
be appropriate because the intent to defraud investors was not the
motivation to enter into the contract. However, where a contract
is entered into with the intent to breach and pay liquidated dam-
ages merely as a method of shifting money from one company to
138. Souza, supra note 6, at 1196.
139. Id.
140. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
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another or increasing the value of accounting records and stock
prices, liability should arise. Obviously a case-by-case approach
would ensure that liability is only extended to the intentional con-
duct of businesses engaging in transactions to manipulate stock
prices and other financial information that is relied upon by pro-
spective investors.
A case-by-case approach to securities litigation involving
schemes would also benefit the securities markets, the larger
economy, and the investors-more than the majority's approach in
Stoneridge. By examining the specific facts of a case, a court may
determine the degree of culpability and, accordingly, whether
scheme liability should be imposed. Such an approach is more
desirable than the Supreme Court's total bar to scheme liability,
which does not consider the severity of any participant's actions in
a scheme and may allow truly fraudulent business practices to go
unpunished in the securities arena merely because state law
causes of action exist to address the situation.
If the courts focused on deterring culpable conduct, the substan-
tial participation test advanced by the Ninth Circuit would be the
appropriate standard to apply to scheme liability cases. The sub-
stantial participation test developed by the Ninth Circuit provides
that parties involved in fraudulent or sham business transactions
may be deemed primary violators if their roles in the culpable
conduct rise to a sufficient level.141 This approach requires the
court to review the actual conduct of the parties and determine
the degree to which they were involved in the transactions and the
subsequent issuance of public statements. 142 Therefore, "[a]s a
result of its focus on conduct, the substantial participation ap-
proach actually deters culpable actors by holding them liable as
primary violators."'143
IV. CONCLUSION
Stoneridge represents the most recent addition to the body of
case law defining what constitutes a primary violator. While the
case is certainly significant in the law of securities regulation, the
Supreme Court unfortunately made several errors. Many of the
issues with the opinion appear to have been introduced because
the Court failed to bear in mind the overarching purpose of the





securities laws. If the Court considered that the securities laws
are designed as remedial statutes that are meant to be flexible to
achieve Congress's intent, the Court would have realized that its
decision did not comport with this purpose. Given the fact that
the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 appear to allow pri-
mary liability, the purpose of Congress in enacting the statutes
should act as the guiding principle courts use in interpreting the
facts of a case implicating scheme liability.
In addition, the Supreme Court failed to extend liability to a
culpable party in Stoneridge. By doing so, the Court has essen-
tially sent a message that businesses may engage in sham busi-
ness transactions and remain silent to avoid any liability. As a
result, the Court's opinion fails to maintain the deterrence effect
that many of the securities laws have on the conduct of investors
and securities issuers. In order to help serve the underlying pur-
poses of the securities laws, the Supreme Court should reconsider
the principles espoused in Stoneridge. Perhaps the best hope for
addressing the Supreme Court's lackluster performance in Ston-
eridge is that Congress takes swift action to clarify that scheme
liability is, in fact, a valid cause of action.
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